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Abstract. We present a novel approach to describing the microstruc-
ture of high frequency trading using two key elements. First we in-
troduce a new notion of informed trader which we starkly contrast to
current informed trader models. We describe the exact nature of the
‘superior information’ high frequency traders have access to, and how
these agents differ from the more standard ‘insider traders’ described in
past papers. This then leads to a model and an empirical analysis of
the data which strongly supports our claims. The second key element
is a rigorous description of clearing conditions on a limit order book
and how to derive correct formulas for such a market. From a theoret-
ical point of view, this allows the exact identification of two frictions
in the market, one of which is intimately linked to our notion of ‘supe-
rior information’. Empirically, we show that ignoring these frictions can
misrepresent the wealth exchanged on the market by 50%. Finally, we
showcase two applications of our approach: we measure the profits made
by high frequency traders on NASDAQ and re-visit the standard Black -
Scholes model to determine how trading frictions alter the delta-hedging
strategy.
1. Introduction
It is impossible to begin a paper on informed trading and the microstruc-
ture of markets without citing the fundamental work of Kyle. This is very
fortunate, as Kyle’s model is a perfect example of an elegant yet sophisti-
cated model that describes with great accuracy an important phenomenon
in financial markets. It is also rather surprising, as the paper was written
nearly three decades ago, when the agents and microstructure of markets
was very different from that of modern days.
Our paper is a tribute to Kyle’s model. Rather than apply the original
findings of his ground-breaking paper in circumstances that it did not seek
to address, we actively engage with it to reflect the advent of high frequency
trading. This allows us to identify the main common points and differences
between the world of 1985 and 2014. The common points are adverse selec-
tion, the impact of informed trades on prices and the ensuing information
rent. The differences are the nature of the informed agents, their trading
strategies and the impact they have on the financial system.
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At the heart of the discussion are two key notions: information and trad-
ing. The combination of the two leads to adverse selection. The former
requires the reader to understand the nature of the advantage the informed
trader enjoys. This can be done through a direct microscopic analysis of
agents: in this case high frequency traders. The latter point is more tech-
nical in nature. Before any economic conclusion can be reached one has to
delve into the exact rules of electronic exchanges. This allows the identifica-
tion of the exact sources of profits and losses for a trader trading electroni-
cally. Both can be tackled on a theoretical level, but also almost physically
grasped through the massive amount of data present in modern markets.
Besides the original work by Kyle ([10]), other microstructure papers focus
on inventory managing market makers ([5, 17, 18, 20]). These models work
under a different market microstructure than the one we study, and are
designed to provide qualitative insights on the price formation. Our focus is
more on high frequency traders, their profits and the empirically measurable
impact they have on the market.
We posit that models of high frequency markets should include our clear-
ing equation and adverse selection model. The main advantage of such an
approach is that it does not require a model for the microstructure noise:
wealth is perfectly matched to data using only market-observable quantities.
We do not track the true price, only the observed mid-price. We refer to [2]
and the reference therein for the very rich literature on microstructure noise
and the corresponding models of high frequency markets. Both the paper
by Y. Ait-Sahalia, P. A. Mykland and L. Zhang [2] and the book by Y. Ait-
Sahalia and J. Jacod [1] have been instrumental in the empirical section of
our paper, as they highlight the technicalities surrounding econometric tests
in high frequency markets. Unlike these references however, our paper aims
to measure and match market quantities without resorting to the notion of
microstructure noise.
An alternative way to model wealth in a high frequency world is the
Almgren and Chriss approach [4], which relies on a linear price-impact rela-
tionship. This approach to adverse selection is more explicit, though more
rigid than ours. It is a purely descriptive, agent-less model. Instead of being
driven by data, its main focus is tractability for a specific type of applica-
tions: optimal execution. Because of this, calibration is not as straight-
forward in the Almgren and Chriss model as in ours. However, the linear
structure leads to closed-form formulas for a larger class of problems, mostly
found in the optimal execution literature (see [3, 21]).
From an empirical point of view, we study a market for a financial asset
traded electronically via a limit order book. Market orders are assumed to
arrive at high frequency and all trades execute either at the best bid or ask
price. Moreover, hidden orders are discarded. The appendix contains more
information on our data set from NASDAQ.
A recent pair of papers using high frequency data is [14, 15]. Both papers
by O’Hara et al. estimate adverse selection by measuring the imbalance
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between buy and sell orders. One of the main technical tools advocated by
these authors is the use of an event-based clock to model electronic markets,
in line with the practice of high frequency trading. We adopt this event-
based point of view, but choose instead to measure adverse selection by the
relationship between executed limit orders and price changes.
We illustrate the significant impact of the trading frictions we identify
with an application to option hedging by replication in the spirit the seminal
work of F. Black and M. Scholes. In our framework, European options are
priced with the same formula, but the volatility needs to be changed to
incorporate the bid-ask spread. Perfect replication is still possible, albeit
with a twist: negative gamma options can only be replicated with limit
orders while positive gamma options are hedged with market orders.
These results on option pricing are reminiscent of, but distinct from,
Leland’s strategy (see [13] for example), in which pricing of European options
under transaction costs is explored. The major differences are 1) the sharp
distinction between the use of limit and market orders as hedging tools; 2)
the impact of adverse selection which is absent in Leland’s model. At a
procedural level, Leland adds transaction costs to a model already set up in
continuous time, while in our approach, we model the market microstructure
frictions at the microscopic level, before the extension to a macroscopic,
continuous time model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
notion of superior information to describe high frequency traders. It is
contrasted to the usual notion of insider information. A simple model is
presented and tested on data. Section 3 begins with a technical descrip-
tion of the clearing mechanism on a high frequency market. This leads to
novel equations that decompose a trader’s wealth into frictionless wealth,
transaction costs and adverse selection costs. An empirical analysis shows
the importance of the so far neglected terms. Finally, section 4 presents
two applications of our framework. The first measures the profits made by
high frequency traders, the effective spread captured by liquidity providers
and provides an econometric test for adverse selection. The paper concludes
with an application to option hedging in the spirit of the standard Black -
Scholes replication argument.
2. Superior Information of High Frequency Traders
This section describes high frequency traders as informed agents. The
main message is that the nature of their information, and the risk they carry,
is radically different from what has been proposed in the microstructure
literature to date. Our canonical reference to contrast the two information
structures is the fundamental work of Kyle on insider trading.
2.1. Insider information or superior information? An informed trader
is an agent who holds more accurate information on an asset than the rest of
the market. The most extreme and well-known example is insider trading,
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where a trader knows ahead of time the true future value of an asset. To
be precise, let us describe the exact nature of the information an insider
has access to, how he trades to take advantage of his information and what
market risks this strategy entails.
The insider trader knows the true value of the asset at some future time.
This tells him the fundamental price of the asset and a time frame on which
the market value has to converge to this price level. The insider trader has
no additional information on the current supply and demand of the asset and
hence will not be able to predict short-term price movements. As expertly
described in [10], if the current market price is lower than the true value
of the asset, the trader will accumulate a position over a long period of
time, regardless of the price movements and make a profit. If the market
price is higher than the true value, the insider will sell the asset over an
extended period of time. His edge is the knowledge of the fundamental price
of the asset. The main risk the insider runs is marking his inventory to the
market. The exact flow of supply and demand can erode his profits through
multiple channels. First, if he trades too fast, the inside information will
be incorporated faster into the price, leading to less profits. Furthermore,
short-term price fluctuations due to supply and demand dynamics can make
his marked-to-market profits volatile. He may be asked to satisfy margin
requirements by the exchange or regulatory collateral requirements. These
will make his return on investment less attractive.
Now consider a high frequency trader. Unlike the insider trader, she has
no additional information on the fundamental value of an asset. She does
not know the true price of the asset at some future point in time. Instead,
a high frequency trader has a much more accurate picture of the current
supply and demand of the asset. This advantage can manifest itself in a
number of ways: she may have access to more market information1 or she
may simply process the information faster2. But just as in the literature on
insider trading, the underlying cause for the information advantage is not as
important as the structure of the information itself -and how it is used-. In
the case of high frequency trading, the information is such that the trader
can predict with near perfect accuracy the next price movement. She profits
from this knowledge by trading in anticipation of these short-term price
movements, buying before the price moves up and selling before the price
moves down. She therefore makes a profit on each trade marked-to-market,
but runs the risk of accumulating an unwanted inventory which may turn
against her in the long run.
1Without being exhaustive, examples of such an information bias are:
(1) The ability to see the full order book beyond the best bid or ask price.
(2) Access to other pools of liquidity, such as alternative exchanges or dark pools.
(3) More processing and storing power to pour over the massive data feeds.
2The canonical and most extreme example of that is latency arbitrage. There have also
been cases of alleged front-running.
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So, in a nutshell, the insider trader and the high-frequency trader can be
seen as mirror images of each other:
• The insider predicts a price level, which corresponds to some funda-
mental information on the asset.
• The high frequency trader predicts price fluctuations due to infor-
mation on the market’s state of supply and demand for the asset.
• The insider makes money accumulating a position in the long run.
All trades go in the same direction.
• The high frequency trader makes marked-to-market profits trade by
trade. Trades oscillate rapidly between buys and sells.
• The insider’s risk is the marked-to-market value of his portfolio.
• The high frequency trader’s risk is to accumulate an inventory.
The current literature does not distinguish between these two types of
informed traders. We will refer to the first one as traders with inside infor-
mation. The second type of trader will be said to have superior information.
After describing these traders in words, we propose a simple model distin-
guishing their behavior.
2.2. A toy model. Let (pn)n=1...N be a sequence of prices and (Ln)n=1...N
a trader’s inventory before the trade at time n, which will happen at the
market price pn (up to some bid-ask spread).
The standard model for a trader with inside information is to say that
the trader has access to the information pN in addition to the current price
pn, but not the intermediate prices. The trading volume at time n is ∆nL =
Ln+1 − Ln, the inventory after the trade minus the inventory before the
trade. For an insider, it will be of the same sign as pN − pn to guarantee
profits at time N . One can find an example of a more explicit trading
strategy for insiders in [10].
Our proposed equivalent for traders with superior information is to give
the trader access to pn+1 instead of pN . The trader with superior information
therefore knows pn as well as the forward-looking price increment ∆np =
pn+1 − pn, but not the prices in the further future. Her trade volume ∆nL
will be of the same sign as ∆np thanks to this look-ahead option.
For an uninformed trader, ∆nL is noise and therefore uncorrelated to
both pN − pn and ∆np.
One could build a full equilibrium model to get a more explicit relation-
ship between ∆nL and ∆np. The bare bones model ∆np∆nL > 0 for traders
with superior information, E∆np∆nL = 0 for noise traders will suffice for
this paper. Note that this relationship can also be interpreted as a form
of price impact, as trading in advance to a price increment cannot be em-
pirically distinguished from the trade moving the price. Indeed, some high
frequency trading strategies rely on a thin order book to cause short-term
price movements instead of predicting them.
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2.3. Empirical analysis. A straightforward way to quantify the above re-
lationship for a given data set is to compute the proportion of trades such
that
(1) ∆nL∆np > 0;
(2) ∆nL∆np = 0;
(3) ∆nL∆np < 0.
Case (1) means that the trade led to price impact. Case (2) means that the
trade left the midprice unchanged and was caused by ’noise’ trading. Case
(3) corresponds to reverse price impact and is also due to noise trading.
Not all trades with price impact come from informed traders: they could
also be the product of lucky noise trades. However, both trades without price
impact and inverse price impact must come from noise traders. Because for
these traders, E∆nL∆np = 0, the amount of false positives when equating
price impact with informed trading is equal to the number of inverse price
impact trades: the lower the amount of trades with inverse price impact, the
higher the proportion of trades with price impact that are due to traders
with superior information rather than noise traders.
stock symbol total nb of trades with price impact without price impact reverse price impact
AA 5115 325 (6.35%) 4789 1 (0.02%)
AAPL 46709 16896 (36.17%) 27466 2347 (5.03%)
ADBE 9031 2270 (25.13%) 6613 148 (1.64%)
AGN 1884 1073 (56.95%) 656 155 (8.23%)
AINV 1882 199 (10.57%) 1678 5 (0.27%)
AMAT 9383 524 (5.58%) 8854 5 (0.06%)
AMED 697 195 (27.97%) 478 24 (3.45%)
AMGN 15200 6494 (42.72%) 8161 545 (3.59%)
AMZN 11966 6098 (50.96%) 5219 649 (5.43%)
ANGO 482 128 (26.55%) 337 17 (3.53%)
APOG 968 411 (42.45%) 501 56 (5.79%)
ARCC 2242 246 (10.97%) 1992 4 (0.18%)
AXP 14395 4070 (28.27%) 9982 343 (2.39%)
AYI 732 438 (59.83%) 231 63 (8.61%)
AZZ 102 63 (61.76%) 21 18 (17.65%)
BAS 469 268 (57.14%) 163 38 (8.11%)
BHI 9648 3474 (36%) 5818 356 (3.69%)
BIIB 4270 2287 (53.55%) 1658 325 (7.62%)
BRCM 18273 3310 (18.11%) 14839 124 (0.68%)
BRE 1141 490 (42.94%) 580 71 (6.23%)
BXS 672 272 (40.47%) 377 23 (3.43%)
BZ 299 110 (36.78%) 167 22 (7.36%)
CB 1906 924 (48.47%) 879 103 (5.41%)
CBEY 519 168 (32.36%) 315 36 (6.94%)
CBT 645 334 (51.78%) 242 69 (10.7%)
CBZ 121 47 (38.84%) 66 8 (6.62%)
CDR 166 58 (34.93%) 104 4 (2.41%)
CELG 7699 3828 (49.72%) 3339 532 (6.91%)
CETV 248 72 (29.03%) 166 10 (4.04%)
CKH 212 123 (58.01%) 63 26 (12.27%)
CMCSA 17870 2410 (13.48%) 15424 36 (0.21%)
CNQR 976 467 (47.84%) 443 66 (6.77%)
COO 221 127 (57.46%) 68 26 (11.77%)
COST 8229 3578 (43.48%) 4346 305 (3.71%)
CPSI 334 167 (50%) 136 31 (9.29%)
CPWR 1855 273 (14.71%) 1576 6 (0.33%)
CR 590 302 (51.18%) 238 50 (8.48%)
CRI 925 487 (52.64%) 369 69 (7.46%)
CSCO 20155 1315 (6.52%) 18836 4 (0.02%)
CSE 1213 169 (13.93%) 1041 3 (0.25%)
CSL 377 189 (50.13%) 145 43 (11.41%)
CTRN 141 62 (43.97%) 68 11 (7.81%)
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CTSH 7991 2958 (37.01%) 4821 212 (2.66%)
DCOM 312 132 (42.3%) 148 32 (10.26%)
DELL 3741 198 (5.29%) 3542 1 (0.03%)
DIS 12956 2924 (22.56%) 9895 137 (1.06%)
DK 1045 549 (52.53%) 381 115 (11.01%)
DOW 8823 1682 (19.06%) 7075 66 (0.75%)
EBAY 47060 11716 (24.89%) 34571 773 (1.65%)
ESRX 10745 2985 (27.78%) 7543 217 (2.02%)
EWBC 6391 1335 (20.88%) 4983 73 (1.15%)
FCN 248 135 (54.43%) 98 15 (6.05%)
FFIC 200 79 (39.5%) 104 17 (8.51%)
FL 3877 1103 (28.44%) 2716 58 (1.5%)
FMER 3747 751 (20.04%) 2965 31 (0.83%)
FPO 256 146 (57.03%) 97 13 (5.08%)
FRED 751 283 (37.68%) 435 33 (4.4%)
FULT 3202 455 (14.2%) 2736 11 (0.35%)
GAS 643 306 (47.58%) 277 60 (9.34%)
GE 12968 916 (7.06%) 12048 4 (0.04%)
GILD 20404 4745 (23.25%) 15370 289 (1.42%)
GLW 7346 403 (5.48%) 6942 1 (0.02%)
GOOG 8594 3919 (45.6%) 4066 609 (7.09%)
GPS 7377 1815 (24.6%) 5465 97 (1.32%)
HON 5813 2170 (37.33%) 3460 183 (3.15%)
HPQ 14918 1823 (12.22%) 13076 19 (0.13%)
IMGN 2416 708 (29.3%) 1627 81 (3.36%)
INTC 28221 1192 (4.22%) 27022 7 (0.03%)
IPAR 172 66 (38.37%) 83 23 (13.38%)
ISIL 2329 382 (16.4%) 1938 9 (0.39%)
ISRG 2415 1189 (49.23%) 1026 200 (8.29%)
JKHY 1002 428 (42.71%) 515 59 (5.89%)
KMB 2608 1414 (54.21%) 981 213 (8.17%)
KR 6546 1253 (19.14%) 5263 30 (0.46%)
LANC 226 100 (44.24%) 105 21 (9.3%)
LECO 1093 526 (48.12%) 503 64 (5.86%)
LPNT 1876 832 (44.34%) 931 113 (6.03%)
LSTR 1156 574 (49.65%) 493 89 (7.7%)
MAKO 1286 339 (26.36%) 920 27 (2.1%)
MANT 482 201 (41.7%) 242 39 (8.1%)
MDCO 1737 753 (43.35%) 900 84 (4.84%)
MELI 812 361 (44.45%) 380 71 (8.75%)
MIG 528 71 (13.44%) 451 6 (1.14%)
MMM 5036 2074 (41.18%) 2682 280 (5.56%)
MOD 110 47 (42.72%) 56 7 (6.37%)
MOS 3754 1549 (41.26%) 2016 189 (5.04%)
MRTN 378 141 (37.3%) 212 25 (6.62%)
MXWL 496 175 (35.28%) 313 8 (1.62%)
NSR 556 258 (46.4%) 247 51 (9.18%)
NUS 1300 629 (48.38%) 561 110 (8.47%)
NXTM 523 140 (26.76%) 359 24 (4.59%)
PBH 123 60 (48.78%) 43 20 (16.27%)
PFE 14626 1314 (8.98%) 13303 9 (0.07%)
PG 18615 3768 (20.24%) 14658 189 (1.02%)
PNC 5277 2015 (38.18%) 3075 187 (3.55%)
PNY 540 248 (45.92%) 231 61 (11.3%)
PTP 513 294 (57.3%) 172 47 (9.17%)
RIGL 2079 371 (17.84%) 1693 15 (0.73%)
ROC 968 523 (54.02%) 336 109 (11.27%)
ROCK 743 214 (28.8%) 507 22 (2.97%)
SF 440 242 (55%) 148 50 (11.37%)
SFG 170 98 (57.64%) 48 24 (14.12%)
SWN 13815 3635 (26.31%) 9953 227 (1.65%)
Table 1. Proportion of trades with price impact, without price impact and with reverse price impact
on 04/18/13 for 103 stocks.
An important empirical remark is that the number of trades exhibiting
inverse price impact is very small. This is probably due to the discrete
nature of prices and the bid-ask spread on high frequency markets3. This
3The so called ’rounding’ effect.
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means that nearly all the trades with price impact were due to traders with
superior information, and that noise traders typically have no price impact.
The empirical reality is therefore even simpler than our model!
3. The Clearing Condition on a Limit Order Book
On a technical level, the aim of this section is to describe accurately
the evolution of the wealth of a trader trading on a high frequency order
book. This is the equivalent of a clearing condition and depends crucially
on whether the trader is trading via limit orders or market orders. The
former will be qualified as a passive trader, while we describe the latter as
an active trader. Once these technical equations have been derived, we can
extract from a trading flow the amount of transaction cost paid as well as the
money lost due to adverse selection by traders with superior information.
As a useful practical consequence, we can also perfectly track trading profits
and avoid the notion of microstructure noise.
3.1. Setup. We first define the quantities of interest. Let pn be the midprice
before the trade happens at time n. The midprice is defined as the midpoint
between the bid and the ask and is often abbreviated to ’the mid’. Similarly,
let sn be the bid-ask spread defined as the difference between the best ask
and the best bid. Note that the number sn/2, the distance between the mid
and either leg of the bid-ask, is often called ’the spread’.
We now single out a trader who’s profits and losses we wish to follow.
Denote by Ln his inventory, that is, his net position in the traded asset.
Finally, define by Kn the amount of cash the trader is holding and assume
that his position is self-financing in the sense that the changes in the inven-
tory and cash account can only come from trading on the high frequency
order book.
The quantities pn, sn, Ln and Kn are necessary and sufficient to, from
an accountant’s perspective, summarize the trader’s strategy given our set
of hypotheses. They are therefore the primary data of our model. It is
common however to summarize the trader’s profits and losses by a single
number called wealth.
The most basic way to define wealth from the primary data is to say it is
the marked to the mid value of the inventory plus the cash holdings. If we
denote by Xn the trader’s wealth before trade n, this leads to the equation:
(3.1) Xn = Lnpn +Kn
This is the main quantity of interest we would like to track, both in the
theoretical model, and through our empirical analyzes of trading data.
3.2. Clearing a trade. We assume the position of the trader to be self-
financing. This imposes relationships between pn, sn, Ln and Kn based on
the clearing rules that underpin trades on a limit order book. There are five
cases to distinguish, depending on whether the trader
(1) triggers a buy with a market order;
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(2) triggers a sell with a market order;
(3) has his buy limit order executed;
(4) has his sell limit order executed;
(5) is not part of the current trade.
In case 1, the trader buys at the ask and therefore
(3.2) Kn+1 −Kn = − (pn + sn/2) (Ln+1 − Ln)
with Ln+1 − Ln > 0.
In case 2, the trader sells at the bid and therefore
(3.3) Kn+1 −Kn = − (pn − sn/2) (Ln+1 − Ln)
with Ln+1 − Ln < 0.
In case 3, the trader buys at the bid and therefore
(3.4) Kn+1 −Kn = − (pn − sn/2) (Ln+1 − Ln)
with Ln+1 − Ln > 0.
In case 4, the trader sells at the ask and therefore
(3.5) Kn+1 −Kn = − (pn + sn/2) (Ln+1 − Ln)
with Ln+1 − Ln < 0.
Finally, in case 5, Kn+1 = Kn and Ln+1 = Ln.
These five cases can be summarized by the equation:
(3.6) ∆nK = −pn∆nL± sn
2
|∆nL|
where ∆nK stands for Kn+1 −Kn and ”±” is defined as ”+” when trading
with limit orders and ”−” when trading with market orders. This is our
clearing condition. It differs from that used in the Black and Scholes model,
where ∆nK = −pn+1∆nL, unless the next mid price is equal to the previous
bid or ask price.
This can be related to the wealth of a self-financing trading strategy by
plugging the equation into the definition Xn = Lnpn + Kn. This leads to
the equation
(3.7) ∆nX = Ln∆np± sn
2
|∆nL|+ ∆nL∆np
where ± has the meaning defined above. These are the trading profits of a
trader.
3.3. Decomposing profits and losses. Equation (3.7) is a simple ac-
counting rule for updating the wealth of a portfolio when trading on a high
frequency order book. It could be stated in several different equivalent forms.
We chose to write it in this way to highlight the last two terms. These differ
from the commonly accepted rule in the frictionless case. We comment on
the three terms separately:
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3.3.1. Frictionless wealth. The standard self-financing equation used in a
frictionless market model is
(3.8) ∆nX = Ln∆np
which coincides with our equation (3.7) when the trader holds his position
without trading. The rational for calling this the frictionless wealth equation
is the notion that whether the trader is holding the position or re-balancing
it, should not affect his wealth. Whether this holds true in practice depends
upon how close the values of the two other terms of equation (3.7) are from
canceling each other.
3.3.2. Transaction costs. The term
(3.9) ± sn
2
|∆nL|
has a clear interpretation as the spread captured or paid during the trans-
action. If one trades with limit orders, the spread is captured for each unit
of traded asset while for market orders, the spread is paid. This term, all
others being equal, favors trading with limit orders and constitutes a first
friction on high frequency markets. Note that the exact form of this trans-
action cost term hinges on the assumption that all trades are made at the
best bid or ask price. In the general case, transaction costs are given by a
convex function of the trade volume. We leave the theoretical discussion of
this fact to the appendix.
3.3.3. Price Impact from adverse selection. The third term is non-standard,
and to the best of our knowledge, such a price impact term has never been
identified and used in this direct form as a contribution to wealth change:
(3.10) ∆np∆nL.
We now propose an interpretation as a form of adverse selection. This links
our clearing condition to the previous discussion on traders with superior
information. First, note that while the passive trader ’controls’ the trans-
action cost term (by choosing how far to placer her limit orders from the
mid price), the active trader controls this term through the trade volume
∆nL. If the active trader has no superior information, then ∆nL will be
uncorrelated to ∆np and this term averages out to zero. If the active trader
has superior information, then ∆np∆nL > 0 from the active trader’s per-
spective, and ∆np∆nL < 0 from the passive trader’s perspective. The trade
will empirically exhibit price impact and the passive trader will lose money
to the active trader.
3.4. Empirical analysis. We now compare empirically three clearing equa-
tions with the empirical exchange of wealth observed on the market.
The standard way to model wealth in the academic finance literature is
to use the frictionless clearing equation:
(3.11) ∆nX = Ln∆np,
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where p is not the midprice, while the ’fair’ price of the asset, which in
an efficient market, is assumed to be a martingale. This equation does not
match the data when we use the midprice and the concept of ’microstructure
noise’ can be invoked to explain this significant gap. In a frictionless market,
microstructure does not matter and profits come solely from longer term
views on the market.
Transaction costs can be added, leading to the clearing equation with
transaction costs:
(3.12) ∆nX = Ln∆np± sn
2
|∆nL|
While this equation takes into account the spread, it ignores price impact.
Is is however a good model for agents who are using market orders and who
do not adversely select the market. This can be the case for low frequency
traders who do not optimize their execution and only use long-term views
to trade.
Finally, incorporating the price impact term leads to a complete picture
of wealth on a high frequency market:
(3.13) ∆nX = Ln∆np± sn
2
|∆nL|+ ∆nL∆np.
This description forgoes the notion of microstructure noise, as wealth can
be perfectly tracked using directly measurable market quantities.
We first compare the impact of transaction costs and price impact by
computing wealth with each of the three equations: the frictionless case
given in (3.11), the case with transaction costs given in (3.12) and the exact
wealth equation (3.13). For the stocks of our universe, we provide the results
in Table 3.
stock symbol relative error friction ratio net P&L
AA 177% 8% 5970 $
AAPL 9% 19% -1779103 $
ADBE 49% 44% -5746 $
AGN 564% 78% -28 $
AINV 140% 16% 1062 $
AMAT 80% 7% -15806 $
AMED 173% 40% 181 $
AMGN 15% 46% -55395 $
AMZN 63% 30% -57491 $
ANGO 149% 44% 127 $
APOG 93% 45% 947 $
ARCC 54% 21% 2690 $
AXP 19% 41% -37162 $
AYI 266% 64% 495 $
AZZ 162% 50% 57 $
BAS 1% 96% -1594 $
BHI 6% 61% 44602 $
BIIB 51% 40% -19266 $
BRCM 41% 29% 23826 $
BRE 8% 58% -3772 $
BXS 108% 69% -133 $
BZ 18% 85% -208 $
CB 58% 58% -1417 $
CBEY 81% 41% 399 $
CBT 25% 74% 769 $
CBZ 1235% 67% -21 $
CDR 13% 62% -260 $
CELG 55% 48% -12403 $
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CETV 122% 40% 108 $
CKH 24% 58% -1248 $
CMCSA 46% 22% 25599 $
CNQR 13% 57% 5837 $
COO 33% 53% 1332 $
COST 7% 51% -32206 $
CPSI 44% 76% 540 $
CPWR 256% 23% 403 $
CR 32% 70% -1619 $
CRI 101% 76% -302 $
CSCO 193% 9% 15086 $
CSE 294% 27% 220 $
CSL 128% 60% -337 $
CTRN 106% 38% 162 $
CTSH 18% 51% 16447 $
DCOM 54% 71% 206 $
DELL 133% 7% -7695 $
DIS 25% 38% 21363 $
DK 28% 65% 2580 $
DOW 394% 35% 921 $
EBAY 406% 34% 6854 $
ESRX 10% 47% 34609 $
EWBC 9% 36% 31326 $
FCN 122% 65% 101 $
FFIC 48% 25% 418 $
FL 11% 50% -9114 $
FMER 35% 41% -4522 $
FPO 56% 114% -85 $
FRED 310% 51% 85 $
FULT 41% 25% -4251 $
GAS 65% 62% 325 $
GE 382% 11% -4446 $
GILD 14% 39% -57605 $
GLW 92% 6% -12881 $
GOOG 22% 32% -211247 $
GPS 61% 48% 3788 $
HON 10% 70% 13206 $
HPQ 73% 19% -18421 $
IMGN 35% 32% -5303 $
INTC 61% 5% 111422 $
IPAR 57% 22% -316 $
ISIL 14680% 28% -8 $
ISRG 320% 45% -6180 $
JKHY 19% 56% -2189 $
KMB 0% 74% 26968 $
KR 310% 36% -839 $
LANC 110% 33% 466 $
LECO 213% 60% 273 $
LPNT 56% 47% 2514 $
LSTR 357% 57% 272 $
MAKO 42% 41% 2031 $
MANT 53% 60% 507 $
MDCO 8% 56% 8883 $
MELI 17% 36% 14901 $
MIG 62% 26% 354 $
MMM 66% 47% -4133 $
MOD 61% 75% -41 $
MOS 13% 60% -10969 $
MRTN 45% 42% -845 $
MXWL 191276% 63% 0 $
NSR 33% 67% 975 $
NUS 10% 42% 22755 $
NXTM 275% 40% 76 $
PBH 27% 43% 436 $
PFE 51% 15% 26718 $
PG 2356% 34% 337 $
PNC 25% 65% -6350 $
PNY 16% 58% 1485 $
PTP 47% 69% 803 $
RIGL 54% 29% -2456 $
ROC 27% 58% 3124 $
ROCK 162% 38% 290 $
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SF 8% 84% -1027 $
SFG 28% 57% 572 $
SWN 37% 45% -12890 $
Table 2. Relative mispricing of wealth using the fricitonless wealth equation. Ratio between adverse
selection and transaction cost friction terms. End of day gains of the aggregate passive trades. The
table was computed for the date 04/18/13.
For the sake of illustration, we also give a plot in figure 1 for our example
stock, Coca Cola on 04/18/13. The plot in particular shows how current
models of wealth cannot even track the realized wealth ex-post ! While mi-
crosctructure noise models such as [2] can be used to measure the error
introduced by ignoring the high frequency microstructure, an exact recon-
struction of wealth that matches the data perfectly is possible and not more
difficult.
As expected, the frictionless equation underestimates true wealth while
the equation ignoring price impact over-estimates the wealth of our aggre-
gate liquidity provider. The relative error is always significant. This comes
as no surprise as microstructure noise adds up very quickly over a trading
day.
4. Applications
Our approach stems from a precise analysis of three ingredients: the
information structure of the agents present in high frequency markets, the
rules underpinning trades on the electronic exchanges and the vast amount of
data present in these markets. As a result, it is particularly apt at answering
practical questions both from a regulatory and a trading perspective and
grounding the research in the modern world.
4.1. Measuring HFT profits. Monitoring the profits made by high fre-
quency traders from their superior information is a first step towards their
regulation. Some HFT traders also employ passive strategies that are not
covered by our model.
First, let us compute the cumulative losses due to adverse selection, the
third term of our wealth equation:
(4.1)
N∑
n=1
∆np∆nL
We give the plot of this quantity as a function of N in figure 2 for a selection
of stocks. Each path corresponds to the cumulative losses of the whole
passive side of the market to traders with superior information for a given
stock on a single day, rescaled. Note that the path is perfectly decreasing, in
line with our model for superior information. In a standard informed trader
model such as [10], these paths would be random walks.
To get a sense of whether passive traders are -on average- sufficiently
compensated for these losses, one can compare the transaction costs earned
to the money lost to adverse selection.
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Figure 1. Example: Coca Cola on 04/18/13. Plots of the
actual wealth of the aggregate passive trader together with
the wealth computed from the three self-financing conditions.
Red is the frictionless case (3.11). Green corresponds to
(3.12). The actual wealth and the wealth computed from
our self-financing condition (3.13) are indistinguishable on
the graph.
As the graph shows, for nearly all the stocks, transaction cost gains are
larger than losses to adverse selection. This means that there is a sufficient
number of noise traders to support the activity of the passive traders. How-
ever, a linear regression shows that the effective spread captured by these
passive traders amounts to 20% of the posted spread. The other 80% go to
the traders with superior information. This is a form of information rent.
4.2. An econometric test for adverse selection. We present an econo-
metric test for adverse selection of the kind described above. We assume
that both the midprice and the aggregate passive trader’s inventory are Itoˆ
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Figure 2. Empirical cumulative losses due to adverse selec-
tion (rescaled) for selected stocks.
processes, say of the form:
(4.2)
{
dpt = µtdt+ σtdWt
dLt = btdt+ ltdW
′
t
with instantaneous correlation ρt between Wt and W
′
t . Then a continuous
version of the adverse selection model implies that
(4.3) ρt ≤ 0,
that is, the changes of a passive trader’s inventory are always negatively
correlated to the price returns. We test the following null hypothesis:
H0: There exists t ∈ [0, 1] such that ρt > 0.
If we denote by pN and LN the discrete measurements of the diffusion
processes p and L on the uniform grid {1/N, 2/N, ..., 1} then [1] suggests to
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Figure 3. Transaction cost against adverse selection com-
ponents for multiple stocks. Line corresponds to y = x. Plot
is in log-log scale and each point corresponds to one stock on
a given day.
consider:
(4.4){
Ct =
∑bNtc−1
n=1 ∆np
N∆nL
N
V Nt = N
∑bNtc−2
n=1
((
∆np
N∆n+1L
N
)2
+ ∆np
N∆nL
N∆n+1p
N∆n+1L
N
)
,
which leads to the following form of the central limit theorem
(4.5) L
(
CNt − [p, L]t√
N−1|V Nt |
)
→ N(0, 1).
The result can then be used to compute rejection probabilities of the null
hypothesis on buckets of M trades assuming that ρt, σt and lt are constant
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on these buckets. We then multiply those rejection probabilities to obtain
the overall rejection probability for the null hypothesis. The results are
given in Table 2 in the case where M is chosen for each stock so that the
trading day is divided into 8 buckets.
stock symbol prob rejection stock symbol prob rejection stock symbol prob rejection
AA 0.45458 CPSI 0.99729 IPAR 0.86019
AAPL 1 CPWR 0.99433 ISIL 0.90428
ADBE 1 CR 0.99835 ISRG 0.99999
AGN 0.99564 CRI 0.99438 JKHY 0.97535
AINV 0.66919 CSCO 0.99975 KMB 0.99999
AMAT 0.88248 CSE 0.93149 KR 0.99999
AMED 0.92732 CSL 0.99042 LANC 0.99475
AMGN 0.99999 CTRN 0.99998 LECO 0.99997
AMZN 0.99999 CTSH 0.99999 LPNT 0.99874
ANGO 0.99496 DCOM 0.98683 LSTR 0.99994
APOG 0.99973 DELL 0.67247 MAKO 0.75563
ARCC 0.93312 DIS 0.99999 MANT 0.99912
AXP 0.99999 DK 0.99988 MDCO 0.99999
AYI 0.99053 DOW 0.99999 MELI 0.84372
AZZ 0.99754 EBAY 1 MMM 0.98094
BAS 0.99952 ESRX 1 MOD 0.99999
BHI 1 EWBC 0.99999 MOS 0.99999
BIIB 0.99999 FCN 0.99974 MRTN 0.99941
BRCM 1 FFIC 0.99922 MXWL 0.99581
BRE 0.9981 FL 0.99999 NSR 0.81248
BXS 0.9992 FMER 0.99911 NUS 0.99385
BZ 0.9997 FPO 0.99979 NXTM 0.9954
CB 0.99999 FRED 0.99916 PBH 0.98192
CBEY 0.66095 FULT 0.91296 PFE 0.99999
CBT 0.98696 GAS 0.89222 PG 1
CBZ 0.99992 GE 0.99989 PNC 0.99999
CDR 0.99999 GILD 0.99999 PNY 0.98274
CELG 0.99999 GLW 0.56781 PTP 0.99217
CETV 0.99917 GOOG 0.99999 RIGL 0.98968
CKH 0.99832 GPS 0.99999 ROC 0.99661
CMCSA 0.99999 HON 0.99999 ROCK 0.87984
CNQR 0.99822 HPQ 0.99999 SF 0.99951
COO 0.97052 IMGN 0.99232 SFG 0.99929
COST 1 INTC 0.99113 SWN 1
Table 3. Probability of rejection for the null hypothesis on 04/18/13.
Table 3 rejects the null hypothesis for nearly all stocks. As a conclusion,
instantaneous adverse selection is very easily measured and modeled on the
continuous time scale. We only tested for the sign of the adverse selection
coefficient ρ, but more practical-minded researchers may be interested in its
magnitude. The correlation is around −0.3 across most stocks. This implies
that only 30% of the inventory of passive traders is due to adverse selection,
but 80% of their profits go to traders with superior information.
4.3. Implications for option pricing. The main result of this rather long
and technical subsection is a result stating which options can be hedged via
limit orders and which can only be hedged via market orders in a Black and
Scholes world.
For tractability reasons, it is often convenient to work in the framework
of continuous time finance. Some quantities, notably the midprice, can then
be modeled as having a Brownian motion component. Using a diffusion
approximation argument, we derive the analogue of our wealth equation
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in continuous time, and revisit the classic Black - Scholes option hedging
argument with this corrected equation.
4.3.1. The limiting equation. Recall the discrete wealth equation:
(4.6) ∆nX = Ln∆np± sn
2
|∆nL|+ ∆np∆nL.
We start with the most standard hypothesis: assuming that we observe
a continuous, diffusive price at discrete times. This leads to a continuous
time model of the form:
(4.7) dpt = µtdt+ σtdWt.
We will also model the inventory with a continuous diffusion process:
(4.8) dLt = btdt+ ltdW
′
t
with instantaneous correlation ρt between Wt and W
′
t . Our rational for
allowing inventories with a correlated Brownian motion is the relative im-
portance of the adverse selection. Without this correlation between changes
in inventories and prices, our model for the price would not provide any of
the significant instantaneous adverse selection found in the data.
Theorem 4.1. The correct continuous-time clearing equation that incorpo-
rates both transaction costs and price impact is:
(4.9) dXt = Ltdpt +
(
ρtσt ± st√
2pi
)
ltdt
where ± is the sign of ρt.
In the limit case ρt = 0, the trade was most likely done with a market
order and hence ± is negative. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Note that if we allow lt to be signed and fix ρt > 0, then the formula
collapses to:
(4.10) dXt = Ltdpt +
(
ρtσt − st√
2pi
)
ltdt
which is convenient when juggling between limit and market orders.
4.3.2. Revisiting Black - Scholes. In this section we assume that any inven-
tory of the form
(4.11) dLt = btdt+ ltdWt
with lt signed, is attainable. If lt ≥ 0, trading is done with market orders
while for lt < 0 trades are done with limit orders.
Assume that the midprice follows a geometric Brownian motion as in the
standard Black - Scholes model:
(4.12) dpt = µptdt+ σptdWt,
and that the spread is proportional to price volatility,
(4.13) st = sσpt.
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for some constant s
If the interest rate r is constant and there are no dividends, then this
market is complete and we can price a European option using the standard
no-arbitrage argument, albeit with a slightly different partial differential
equation (PDE) because of the two sources of frictions. The pricing PDE
for the value v of a European option is
(4.14)
∂v
∂t
(t, p) +
σ2p2
2
(√
2
pi
s− 1
)
∂2v
∂p2
(t, p) + rp
∂v
∂p
(t, p) = rv(t, p)
which is the same equation as a local volatility model with a factor of
(4.15)
√√
2
pi
s− 1
on the volatility. The spread therefore acts as a multiplier on the implied
volatility of an option. The larger the spread, the larger the implied volatility
market makers will quote. The full derivation is presented in the appendix.
A consequence of the proof is that the traditional delta-hedge still leads
to perfect replication in a Black - Scholes market with transaction costs
and instantaneous adverse selection. However, if we write the delta hedge
equation
(4.16) LT =
∂v
∂p
(t, pt),
then that leads to the identity
(4.17) lt = σpt
∂2v
∂p2
(t, pt),
which in particular implies that delta-hedging negative gamma options can
only be done with limit orders, while delta-hedging positive gamma options
is done with market orders.
For an intuitive example of this phenomenon consider a call option. It
has positive gamma: in order to delta-hedge this option, one needs to buy
when the price goes up and sell when the price goes down. But, because of
adverse selection, the price tends to move down when you buy with limit
orders and up when you sell with limit orders. Therefore, market orders are
to be preferred to delta-hedge a call option. However, if you are selling a
call option then the opposite of a call option must be delta-hedged, which
can be done with limit orders.
In addition to computing prices and delta-hedging ratios under trans-
action costs and instantaneous adverse selection, this theory suggests an
execution strategy by quantifying when limit or market orders should be
used.
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Appendix A. NASDAQ data
Our raw data consists of NASDAQ’s ITCH data files, which include all
visible limit and market orders, as well as market orders that execute hidden
liquidity. We clean up the data by removing ’special deals’, trades that
happen within the bid-ask spread, and market orders that execute hidden
liquidity. This leaves us with only visible market orders hitting visible limit
orders at the best bid or ask price. While this is the natural state of the
data, one may wish to reconstitute parent orders, in which case not all trades
would happen at the best bid or ask price. We propose a method for doing
so later in the appendix.
Because the data does not provide the identity of the different traders,
we work by aggregating all the passive trades. This means we parse all the
trades as viewed from the limit order’s perspective, construct the aggregate
portfolio, and consider that as our ’trader’. The figures included in this
paper were produced using the data for Coca Cola (KO) on 18/04/13. A full
cross-section of 120 stocks used in the recent ECB study [7] was considered
over multiple days to test for robustness of our results. We removed some of
the stocks from certain tables when the number of trades was not sufficiently
large to run the corresponding analysis.
A.1. Ignored trades. For the sake of completeness, we include a table of
how many executions were discarded for each stock. They correspond to
symbols ’C’ and ’P’ in the NASDAQ ITCH messaging convention. Type ’C’
messages correspond to special deals while type ’P’ messages to trades that
execute against a hidden limit order. Note that -for some stocks- hidden
executions are very important.
stock symbol percent type ’C’ percent type ’P’ stock symbol percent type ’C’ percent type ’P’
AA 1.4% 16.6% FCN 0.3% 24%
AAPL 0.4% 36.3% FFIC 0% 24.2%
ADBE 1.3% 7.5% FL 1.4% 6.2%
AGN 1.2% 12.9% FMER 1.5% 8.4%
AINV 1.4% 18.8% FPO 0.2% 24.1%
AMAT 1.8% 14.2% FRED 0.3% 7.4%
AMED 0.7% 13.6% FULT 1.6% 8.5%
AMGN 1.5% 11.8% GAS 1.1% 18.3%
AMZN 0.5% 25.9% GE 2.7% 9.1%
ANGO 0.3% 19% GILD 1.4% 9.5%
APOG 0.5% 15.2% GLW 1.6% 13.4%
ARCC 4.5% 9.9% GOOG 0.9% 31%
AXP 2.1% 13.8% GPS 2.2% 7.8%
AYI 0.7% 26.8% HON 2.5% 13.6%
AZZ 0.8% 17.6% HPQ 2.3% 5.1%
BAS 0.9% 12.2% IMGN 0.8% 13.4%
BHI 2.8% 8.2% INTC 2.2% 11.9%
BIIB 0.8% 23.7% IPAR 0% 25.5%
BRCM 2.6% 6.7% ISIL 1% 11.3%
BRE 1.6% 14.3% ISRG 0.3% 27.3%
BXS 5.3% 15.7% JKHY 0.8% 15.1%
BZ 4.9% 12.1% KMB 1.7% 17.3%
CB 1.6% 11.2% KR 1.7% 8.1%
CBEY 0.5% 8.7% LANC 1% 23.4%
CBT 0.4% 20.1% LECO 0.3% 12.2%
CBZ 1.4% 8.8% LPNT 0.6% 20.5%
CDR 2.9% 15.2% LSTR 0.1% 12.2%
CELG 0.8% 25% MAKO 1.6% 12%
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CETV 0% 5.3% MANT 0.3% 15.2%
CKH 1.4% 19.1% MDCO 0.6% 15%
CMCSA 1.7% 10.6% MELI 0.2% 28.9%
CNQR 0.8% 16.3% MIG 2% 15.9%
COO 0.3% 23.9% MMM 1.7% 14.4%
COST 1.3% 6.4% MOD 0.7% 16.5%
CPSI 0.3% 41.1% MOS 2% 11.2%
CPWR 2.2% 8.9% MRTN 0% 18.5%
CR 0.6% 9.3% MXWL 1.1% 14%
CRI 0.6% 12.9% NSR 1.4% 17.7%
CSCO 1.1% 8.9% NUS 1.7% 15.8%
CSE 1.2% 16.7% NXTM 1.6% 21.9%
CSL 0.5% 27% PBH 0.7% 11.4%
CTRN 1.5% 23.8% PFE 2.7% 9.7%
CTSH 1.7% 12.2% PG 3.1% 7%
DCOM 0.8% 16% PNC 1.5% 11.8%
DELL 3.2% 12% PNY 1% 8%
DIS 2.2% 6.9% PTP 0.4% 15.4%
DK 1.8% 17.9% RIGL 1% 12.4%
DOW 2.1% 6.7% ROC 1.7% 11.7%
EBAY 2.1% 11.6% ROCK 0.8% 8.2%
ESRX 2.1% 8.5% SF 0.3% 14.8%
EWBC 2.1% 9.8% SFG 1.6% 50.7%
SWN 2.3% 9.8%
Table 4. Proportion of ignored trades. Type ‘C’ correspond to ‘special deals’ while type ‘P’ execute
against hidden limit orders.
A.2. Reconstructing parent orders. Throughout the paper we assume
that all trades happen at the best bid or ask price. In general however, a
small percentage of trades do go deeper into the book and consume liquidity
from the next bid and ask prices. Unfortunately, the raw ITCH data does
not indicate how to reconstruct these ‘parent orders’ from the sequence of
messages printed in the file. We propose a reconstruction heuristic and, for
the sake of completeness, present our empirical results in the general case.
stock symbol total nb of trades with price impact without price impact reverse price impact
AA 1330 324 (24.36%) 1005 1 (0.08%)
AAPL 29496 15979 (54.17%) 11194 2323 (7.88%)
ADBE 4724 2250 (47.62%) 2326 148 (3.14%)
AGN 1523 1053 (69.13%) 314 156 (10.25%)
AINV 785 198 (25.22%) 582 5 (0.64%)
AMAT 2632 522 (19.83%) 2105 5 (0.19%)
AMED 495 195 (39.39%) 276 24 (4.85%)
AMGN 9832 6369 (64.77%) 2918 545 (5.55%)
AMZN 9101 5746 (63.13%) 2717 638 (7.02%)
ANGO 341 128 (37.53%) 196 17 (4.99%)
APOG 675 407 (60.29%) 213 55 (8.15%)
ARCC 926 246 (26.56%) 676 4 (0.44%)
AXP 8147 3985 (48.91%) 3814 348 (4.28%)
AYI 663 437 (65.91%) 163 63 (9.51%)
AZZ 102 63 (61.76%) 21 18 (17.65%)
BAS 393 268 (68.19%) 87 38 (9.67%)
BHI 5966 3444 (57.72%) 2165 357 (5.99%)
BIIB 3633 2256 (62.09%) 1055 322 (8.87%)
BRCM 6849 3269 (47.72%) 3452 128 (1.87%)
BRE 896 486 (54.24%) 340 70 (7.82%)
BXS 495 272 (54.94%) 200 23 (4.65%)
BZ 183 110 (60.1%) 51 22 (12.03%)
CB 1393 919 (65.97%) 371 103 (7.4%)
CBEY 404 168 (41.58%) 200 36 (8.92%)
CBT 527 327 (62.04%) 132 68 (12.91%)
CBZ 100 45 (45%) 47 8 (8%)
CDR 113 58 (51.32%) 51 4 (3.54%)
CELG 5602 3737 (66.7%) 1332 533 (9.52%)
CETV 157 72 (45.85%) 75 10 (6.37%)
CKH 192 122 (63.54%) 44 26 (13.55%)
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CMCSA 6410 2402 (37.47%) 3969 39 (0.61%)
CNQR 769 465 (60.46%) 238 66 (8.59%)
COO 202 125 (61.88%) 51 26 (12.88%)
COST 5473 3483 (63.63%) 1687 303 (5.54%)
CPSI 297 164 (55.21%) 102 31 (10.44%)
CPWR 686 273 (39.79%) 407 6 (0.88%)
CR 493 298 (60.44%) 146 49 (9.94%)
CRI 703 483 (68.7%) 151 69 (9.82%)
CSCO 5025 1315 (26.16%) 3706 4 (0.08%)
CSE 486 168 (34.56%) 316 2 (0.42%)
CSL 338 187 (55.32%) 108 43 (12.73%)
CTRN 112 62 (55.35%) 39 11 (9.83%)
CTSH 4924 2941 (59.72%) 1770 213 (4.33%)
DCOM 248 132 (53.22%) 84 32 (12.91%)
DELL 1162 198 (17.03%) 963 1 (0.09%)
DIS 5801 2900 (49.99%) 2762 139 (2.4%)
DK 868 535 (61.63%) 219 114 (13.14%)
DOW 3552 1679 (47.26%) 1807 66 (1.86%)
EBAY 21407 11430 (53.39%) 9191 786 (3.68%)
ESRX 5771 2957 (51.23%) 2595 219 (3.8%)
EWBC 3000 1328 (44.26%) 1599 73 (2.44%)
FCN 202 134 (66.33%) 53 15 (7.43%)
FFIC 150 75 (50%) 58 17 (11.34%)
FL 2183 1099 (50.34%) 1026 58 (2.66%)
FMER 2015 751 (37.27%) 1233 31 (1.54%)
FPO 207 145 (70.04%) 50 12 (5.8%)
FRED 530 281 (53.01%) 217 32 (6.04%)
FULT 1626 454 (27.92%) 1161 11 (0.68%)
GAS 494 302 (61.13%) 132 60 (12.15%)
GE 3351 913 (27.24%) 2434 4 (0.12%)
GILD 9700 4707 (48.52%) 4704 289 (2.98%)
GLW 1703 399 (23.42%) 1303 1 (0.06%)
GOOG 6745 3766 (55.83%) 2366 613 (9.09%)
GPS 3446 1809 (52.49%) 1540 97 (2.82%)
HON 3622 2151 (59.38%) 1290 181 (5%)
HPQ 4337 1819 (41.94%) 2498 20 (0.47%)
IMGN 1461 705 (48.25%) 674 82 (5.62%)
INTC 6863 1190 (17.33%) 5666 7 (0.11%)
IPAR 138 66 (47.82%) 49 23 (16.67%)
ISIL 1002 381 (38.02%) 612 9 (0.9%)
ISRG 2015 1165 (57.81%) 654 196 (9.73%)
JKHY 721 421 (58.39%) 240 60 (8.33%)
KMB 2044 1394 (68.19%) 435 215 (10.52%)
KR 2848 1251 (43.92%) 1566 31 (1.09%)
LANC 168 99 (58.92%) 48 21 (12.5%)
LECO 807 524 (64.93%) 219 64 (7.94%)
LPNT 1401 821 (58.6%) 465 115 (8.21%)
LSTR 938 571 (60.87%) 278 89 (9.49%)
MAKO 756 337 (44.57%) 392 27 (3.58%)
MANT 364 201 (55.21%) 124 39 (10.72%)
MDCO 1219 750 (61.52%) 385 84 (6.9%)
MELI 665 354 (53.23%) 240 71 (10.68%)
MIG 302 71 (23.5%) 226 5 (1.66%)
MMM 3212 2058 (64.07%) 874 280 (8.72%)
MOS 2411 1541 (63.91%) 681 189 (7.84%)
MRTN 307 141 (45.92%) 141 25 (8.15%)
MXWL 327 175 (53.51%) 144 8 (2.45%)
NSR 464 256 (55.17%) 157 51 (11%)
NUS 1030 625 (60.67%) 295 110 (10.68%)
NXTM 369 140 (37.94%) 205 24 (6.51%)
PBH 105 57 (54.28%) 28 20 (19.05%)
PFE 3729 1310 (35.13%) 2410 9 (0.25%)
PG 7489 3742 (49.96%) 3557 190 (2.54%)
PNC 3171 2000 (63.07%) 982 189 (5.97%)
PNY 428 248 (57.94%) 119 61 (14.26%)
PTP 462 291 (62.98%) 125 46 (9.96%)
RIGL 1038 371 (35.74%) 652 15 (1.45%)
ROC 811 521 (64.24%) 181 109 (13.45%)
ROCK 531 214 (40.3%) 295 22 (4.15%)
SF 367 241 (65.66%) 76 50 (13.63%)
SFG 149 96 (64.42%) 29 24 (16.11%)
SWN 6615 3604 (54.48%) 2787 224 (3.39%)
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Figure 4. Example : Coca Cola (KO) stock on 18/04/13.
Inventory, cash and wealth are those of the aggregate liquid-
ity provider.
Table 1-bis. Same table as Table 1 with reconstruction of parent trades.
stock symbol relative error friction ratio net P&L
AA 53% 72% 5952 $
AAPL 9% 27% -1776517 $
ADBE 1% 101% -5748 $
AGN 33% 101% 154 $
AINV 71% 58% 1049 $
AMAT 38% 55% -15810 $
AMED 111% 61% 181 $
AMGN 6% 76% -54822 $
AMZN 67% 38% -50457 $
ANGO 74% 72% 127 $
APOG 65% 61% 945 $
ARCC 14% 78% 2689 $
AXP 3% 89% -37167 $
AYI 270% 69% 339 $
AZZ 162% 50% 57 $
BAS 4% 111% -1594 $
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BHI 1% 109% 44562 $
BIIB 43% 49% -19267 $
BRCM 2% 96% 23825 $
BRE 5% 79% -3915 $
BXS 2% 97% -134 $
BZ 19% 120% -210 $
CB 49% 80% -1420 $
CBEY 46% 66% 397 $
CBT 12% 86% 747 $
CBZ 660% 73% -5 $
CDR 23% 96% -264 $
CELG 46% 65% -12114 $
CETV 64% 68% 106 $
CKH 22% 62% -1278 $
CMCSA 6% 89% 25597 $
CNQR 9% 68% 5833 $
COO 35% 60% 1227 $
COST 5% 78% -33351 $
CPSI 43% 77% 534 $
CPWR 39% 88% 403 $
CR 5% 85% -1441 $
CRI 13% 103% -242 $
CSCO 37% 82% 15076 $
CSE 1513% 88% 270 $
CSL 95% 64% -246 $
CTRN 93% 46% 162 $
CTSH 4% 88% 16442 $
DCOM 18% 90% 205 $
DELL 70% 52% -7703 $
DIS 1% 103% 21357 $
DK 21% 79% 2473 $
DOW 43% 107% 916 $
EBAY 57% 91% 6931 $
ESRX 1% 94% 34603 $
EWBC 2% 85% 31333 $
FCN 73% 78% 119 $
FFIC 39% 45% 415 $
FL 0% 100% -9313 $
FMER 4% 91% -4523 $
FPO 73% 150% -125 $
FRED 186% 71% 84 $
FULT 17% 68% -4258 $
GAS 54% 76% 365 $
GE 35% 91% -4446 $
GILD 1% 95% -57616 $
GLW 37% 61% -12927 $
GOOG 11% 40% -211606 $
GPS 11% 109% 3787 $
HON 6% 117% 13242 $
HPQ 6% 106% -18432 $
IMGN 18% 65% -5328 $
INTC 22% 65% 111332 $
IPAR 52% 28% -317 $
ISIL 1473% 90% 11 $
ISRG 283% 52% -6182 $
JKHY 9% 78% -2198 $
KMB 10% 97% 25836 $
KR 43% 108% -846 $
LANC 87% 44% 484 $
LECO 86% 84% 273 $
LPNT 29% 67% 2487 $
LSTR 282% 73% 215 $
MAKO 16% 77% 2030 $
MANT 24% 82% 507 $
MDCO 1% 84% 8878 $
MELI 15% 43% 14892 $
MIG 50% 40% 413 $
MMM 53% 83% -4529 $
MOS 0% 96% -10969 $
MRTN 41% 46% -846 $
MXWL 5147% 97% -1 $
NSR 11% 89% 952 $
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NUS 9% 54% 22755 $
NXTM 192% 58% 76 $
PBH 29% 56% 419 $
PFE 5% 90% 26718 $
PG 97% 101% 216 $
PNC 10% 113% -6350 $
PNY 9% 75% 1483 $
PTP 41% 79% 755 $
RIGL 14% 80% -2456 $
ROC 24% 68% 3124 $
ROCK 99% 56% 317 $
SF 2% 95% -1029 $
SFG 23% 62% 538 $
SWN 1% 104% -12890 $
Table 2-bis. Same as Table 2 with reconstruction of parent trades.
stock symbol prob rejection stock symbol prob rejection stock symbol prob rejection
AA 0.96728 CPSI 0.99755 IPAR 0.91515
AAPL 1 CPWR 0.99889 ISIL 0.82535
ADBE 0.99999 CR 0.99897 ISRG 0.99996
AGN 0.99931 CRI 0.99625 JKHY 0.99046
AINV 0.91669 CSCO 0.99999 KMB 0.99999
AMAT 0.99682 CSE 0.99838 KR 0.99999
AMED 0.95456 CSL 0.98687 LANC 0.99987
AMGN 0.99999 CTRN 0.99999 LECO 0.99981
AMZN 0.99999 CTSH 0.99999 LPNT 0.99999
ANGO 0.99997 DCOM 0.99999 LSTR 0.99991
APOG 0.98397 DELL 0.78661 MAKO 0.91648
ARCC 0.99519 DIS 0.99999 MANT 0.99888
AXP 0.99999 DK 0.99812 MDCO 0.99998
AYI 0.99354 DOW 0.99999 MELI 0.90214
AZZ 0.99754 EBAY 1 MIG 0.98378
BAS 0.99999 ESRX 1 MMM 0.90883
BHI 1 EWBC 0.99999 MOS 0.99999
BIIB 0.99999 FCN 0.99989 MRTN 0.99528
BRCM 0.99999 FFIC 0.99999 MXWL 0.99998
BRE 0.99718 FL 0.99999 NSR 0.96399
BXS 0.9992 FMER 0.90467 NUS 0.9958
BZ 0.99976 FPO 0.99999 NXTM 0.9997
CB 0.99999 FRED 0.99988 PBH 0.99717
CBEY 0.88292 FULT 0.99946 PFE 0.99999
CBT 0.98185 GAS 0.99863 PG 1
CBZ 0.99998 GE 0.99999 PNC 0.99999
CDR 0.99999 GILD 1 PNY 0.99559
CELG 0.99999 GLW 0.89184 PTP 0.99237
CETV 0.9999 GOOG 1 RIGL 0.99953
CKH 0.99927 GPS 0.99999 ROC 0.99412
CMCSA 0.99999 HON 0.99999 ROCK 0.99036
CNQR 0.98594 HPQ 0.99999 SF 0.99888
COO 0.92067 IMGN 0.98296 SFG 0.99996
COST 0.99992 INTC 0.99999 SWN 1
Table 3-bis. Same table as Table 3 with reconstruction of the parent trades.
The discrete time self-financing equation in the general case takes the
form
(A.1) ∆nX = Ln∆np± cn (∆nL) + ∆nL∆np
where cn is the transaction cost function associated to the order book. In the
case where all the trades happen at the best bid or ask price, this function
is equal to cn(l) =
sn
2 |l|.
The heuristic we employ to reconstruct parent orders in the ITCH data is
as follows. We declare that multiple trades are children of the same parent
order if the following three conditions are satisfied
(1) They all have the exact same timestamp.
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(2) They are all in the same direction (Buy or Sell).
(3) In between each trade message, there are no other messages for the
same stock. In particular, the order book did not change in between
two such consecutive messages.
We believe this to be a rather conservative heuristic. Most trades still hap-
pen at the best bid or ask price.
The main effect of the reconstruction of parent orders is to reduce the
number of trades where the midprice does not move. This can be seen on
the table giving the proportion of trades with, without and with reverse
price impact (Table 1-bis). Because of that, our main test is boosted as the
instantaneous correlation between liquidity provider inventory and prices is
more significant (Table 2-bis). The results of Table 3-bis reflect the higher
amount of trades with price impact: the ratio between the adverse selection
and the transaction costs increases and sometimes becomes bigger than 1.
To conclude, reconstructing parent orders complicates the theory, but
improves all statistical measures of instantaneous adverse selection.
Appendix B. Proof of the continuous self-financing equation
The aim of this section is to derive formula (4.9) from its discrete version
(3.7). In the process, we shall also derive the continuous-time analog of
the instantaneous adverse selection constraint. The key is to let the tick
size vanish, assume that the bid-ask spread vanishes with the tick size, and
assume that the price and inventory converge to diffusion limits.
B.0.1. The spread. This is conceptually the trickiest part of the argument.
If we assume the spread to be of a fixed size, then the transaction cost
component of our wealth equation explodes. This is not what we observe
empirically in the data however, and we must adapt our set of hypotheses
accordingly.
Our claim is that the spread vanishes in order 1/
√
N . Our argument
for this is to say that the spread is -both empirically and theoretically-
a multiple of the price grid and hence the price jumps. Given that in a
continuous time model, price jumps are of order 1/
√
N it is consistent to
have the spread scale in 1/
√
N . We call this hypothesis a ’vanishing bid-ask
spread’ and denote in the continuous limit by st the spread measured in the
price-change unit.
The main technical tool we use is the functional law of large number for
a discretized process by Jacod and Protter [19]. Let φσ2 denote the density
function of the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2.
Theorem B.1 ((7.2.2) from [19]). Let (t, y)→ Ft(y) be an adapted random
function that is a.s. continuous in (t, y) and verifies the growth condition
Ft(y) ≤ Cy2 for some constant C. Then we have the following convergence
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u.c.p. as N →∞ for any continuous Itoˆ process Y :
1
N
bNtc∑
n=1
Fn/N
(√
N(Y(n+1)/N − Yn/N )
)
→
∫ t
0
∫
Fs(y)φσ2s (y)dy ds
where σ2t =
d[Y,Y ]t
dt .
We proceed as follows:
(1) We start from continuous time processes for the inventory L, price
p and bid-ask spread s as our data.
(2) By time discretization, we obtain the data to plug into the discrete-
time clearing equations listed in section 3, yielding our discrete time
output relationships.
(3) Finally, we take the limit to obtain the diffusion limits of our discrete
output to obtain our continuous-time relationships.
In discrete time, the midprice is a pure-jump process, and therefore has
finite variations. It is common on larger time scales to consider the price
as ‘zoomed out’ enough to be approximated by a diffusion process. Mathe-
matically, this corresponds to a vanishing tick size. Recall that tick size is
typically of the order of magnitude of the cent4, that is 10−4 relative to the
typical stock price. Given the relative roughness of the path of inventories
when compared to prices it seems reasonable to also expect high-frequency
inventories to be modeled by processes with infinite variation.
B.1. Mathematical Setup. Let W and W ′ be two Brownian motions with
unspecified correlation structure. We consider two Itoˆ processes for the price
p and the inventory of L a liquidity provider :
(B.1)
{
pt = p0 +
∫ t
0 µudu+
∫ t
0 σudWu
Lt = L0 +
∫ t
0 budu+
∫ t
0 ludW
′
u
where p0 and L0 are given initial conditions and µ, σ, b and l are adapted
continuous processes. Finally, we also assume the existence of an adapted
continuous process s.
Now consider the discrete approximation pNn = pn/N and likewise for L, µ,
σ, b and l. The interpretation is that 1√
N
is the tick size, which we formally
make vanish. For the bid-ask spread s, we define sNn =
1√
N
sn/N in line with
our previous comments. Plugging these definitions into our discrete model
leads to:
(B.2)
{
∆nX
N = LNn ∆np
N +
sn/N
2
1√
N
|∆nLN |+ ∆npN∆nLN
∆nL
N∆np
N ≤ 0
where the first equation is understood as the definition of the wealth XN .
4Decibasis point for some exchanges in the foreign exchange market.
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B.2. Main result.
Theorem B.2. Assuming that relations (B.2) hold for every N ≥ 1, then
the limit limN→∞XNbNtc exists for the uniform convergence in probability and
defines a process Xt which together with the Itoˆ processes pt and Lt satisfy
the relationships:
(B.3)
{
dXt = Ltdpt +
stlt√
2pi
dt+ d[L, p]t
d[L, p]t ≤ 0
Proof. Using a localizing sequence of stopping times if needed, we can as-
sume without any loss of generality that the process st is bounded by a
constant. The convergence of the discrete approximations of
∫ t
0 Ludpu and
[L, p]t is plain, proving the second relationship.
For the last term of the self-financing equation, we have that
(B.4)
sNn
2
1√
N
|∆nLN | = 1
2N
sn/N |
√
N∆nL
N |
which allows us to apply Theorem B.1 with Ft(y) =
st
2 |y| and Yt = Lt. This
proves the self-financing equation. 
Remark B.3. Technically speaking, nothing prevents us from using the
same limiting argument for the hidden part of the order book, simply re-
placing pt and st by their ‘hidden’ counterparts. Two practical problems
appear however. First, measuring the hidden price and spread is difficult.
Second, and more importantly, it is unclear by what to replace the price im-
pact inequality, as adverse selection of hidden orders is rarely studied and,
in any case, poorly understood.
B.3. The case of a liquidity taker. By symmetry, the corresponding
equations for the inventory and wealth of a liquidity taker are
(B.5)
{
dXt = Ltdpt − stlt√2pidt+ d[L, p]t
d[L, p]t ≥ 0
Unfortunately, as we already pointed out, both the equations for the liquidity
provider and the liquidity taker are only necessary conditions. Indeed, unlike
with the standard self-financing equation, it is difficult to tell which processes
L and p are admissible: we can only derive X once L and p are given.
To give an example of why not all L can be attained, assume the volume
on the order book is finite. Then the volatility of L must be bounded by
the amount of volume available. Other factors that can come into play to
determine which processes L are actually attainable by market participants
are: limit order fill rate, instantaneous price recovery and for market orders
the ability to predict the next price jump. These factors will directly impact
the volatility of L and the possible correlation and quadratic covariation
between L and p.
Ultimately, supply and demand rule the price p and volume L. X, how-
ever, stems from accounting rules.
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Appendix C. Derivation of the Black - Scholes PDE
In this section we prove the pricing PDE (4.14) for a European option in
a Black - Scholes model with transaction costs and price impact.
C.1. Mathematical setup. Let W be a Brownian motion and r the con-
stant interest rate the cash account is subject to. Assume the midprice pt
to satisfy the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
(C.1) dpt = µptdt+ σptdWt,
and let the spread st be of the form s(pt) for some continuous function s.
Given an adapted Itoˆ process
(C.2) Lt = L0 +
∫ t
0
budu+
∫ t
0
ludWu
representing an agent’s inventory, and a real K0 representing his initial cash
endowment, his wealth is defined as
(C.3)
Xt = L0p0 +K0 +
∫ t
0
Ludpu +
∫ t
0
(
σpu − s(pu)√
2pi
)
ludu+
∫ t
0
r(Xt − ptLt)dt
where we have used equation (4.10) as lt is signed. The last term comes
from the interest gained on the cash account Kt = Xt − ptLt.
The objective is to find Xtsuch that we have XT = f(pT ) at a given
terminal time T for a given payoff function f .
C.2. The result.
Theorem C.1. Let f be a continuous function and T > 0. Assume v to be
the solution of the PDE
(C.4)
∂v
∂t
(t, p) +
σ2p2
2
(
s(p)
√
2
σp
√
pi
− 1
)
∂2v
∂p2
(t, p) + rp
∂v
∂p
(t, p) = rv(t, p)
with terminal condition v(T, p) = f(p). Then Lt =
∂v
∂p(t, pt), and the choice
K0 = v(0, p0)− ∂v∂p(0, p0)p0 leads to XT = f(pT ). Furthermore,
(C.5) lt = σpt
∂2v
∂p2
(t, pt).
Proof. Consider the process X˜t = e
−r(t−T )Xt. Choosing the “delta” for the
holdings Lt, namely
(C.6) Lt =
∂v
∂p
(t, pt)
leads to
(C.7) lt = σpt
∂2v
∂p2
(t, pt)
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and hence
dX˜t = e
−r(t−T )
(
(µ− r)pt∂v
∂p
(t, pt)− σ2p2t
(
s(pt)
σpt
√
2pi
− 1
)
∂2v
∂p2
(t, pt)
)
dt
+ e−r(t−T )
∂v
∂p
(t, pt)ptσdWt
= e−r(t−T )
(
−rv(t, pt) + µpt∂v
∂p
(t, pt) +
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2v
∂p2
(t, pt) + σpt
∂v
∂t
(t, pt)
)
dt
+ e−r(t−T )
∂v
∂p
(t, pt)ptσdWt
= d(e−r(t−T )v(t, pt))
As the initial values match, we have that Xt = v(t, pt). This concludes. 
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